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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-3-102(3)(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in granting a "fair degree of 
deference" to the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Appellee's claim of 
Boundary by Estoppel? 
Standard of review: Whether a court applies the appropriate standard of review is a 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1244 (Utah 1998); see also Drake v. Indus. Comm yn of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 180-182 
(Utah 1997). "A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 1989). A grant of 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Gerbich v. Numedlnc, 1999 UT 37, U 
10, 977 P.2d 1205. Whereas summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, appellate 
courts give no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 
928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also CECO Corp., 772 P.2d at 969. In reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, the Court "view[s] all facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and recite[s] the facts accordingly." Mast, 971 P.2d at 
929. 
Where an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, "the measure of 
1 
discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); see also State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ffi| 23-24, 42, 
144 P.3D 1096. Even when there is a mixed question of fact and law, where there is a 
distinguishable issue that presents a question of law, the Court on appeal will review the 
determination of law for correctness and does not grant any deference to the trial court on 
that issue. See Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, f 13, 176 P.3d 464; see also 
State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517,18, 153 P.3d 830. 
This issue was preserved for appeal insomuch as the Imuses asserted the boundary 
by equitable estoppel claim in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R at 478-48); Rob and Sherri Bahr and lone Senn (hereinafter 
"Bahrs") opposed the Imuses9 boundary by equitable estoppel claim in their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R at 664-
667); and the Bahrs argued against the Imuses' boundary by equitable estoppel claim at 
the August 20, 2007 oral argument hearing (R at 1206, pg. 39:7 - 44:20). After an appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Bahrs filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the 
Utah Supreme Court, requesting that certiorari be granted concerning whether the Court 
of Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review on the Imuses Boundary by 
Estoppel claim. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pgs. 9-13 (filed August 12, 2009). 
The Utah Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari as to this issue. See Order 
(November 23,2009). 
Issue 2: Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the 
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doctrine of Boundary by Estoppel does not require that a permanent improvement be 
made to the disputed parcel of real property? 
Standard of review: Whether a court applies the appropriate elements to a claim or 
defense is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234,1244 (Utah 1998); see also S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439,440-41 (Utah 1998); 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); AX. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
This issue was preserved for appeal insomuch as the Imuses asserted the boundary 
by equitable estoppel claim in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R at 478-48); Rob and Sherri Bahr and lone Senn (hereinafter 
"Bahrs") opposed the Imuses5 boundary by equitable estoppel claim in their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R at 664-
667); and the Bahrs argued against the Imuses' boundary by equitable estoppel claim at 
the August 20, 2007 oral argument hearing (R at 1206, pg. 39:7 - 44:20). After an appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Bahrs filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the 
Utah Supreme Court, requesting that certiorari be granted concerning whether the Court 
of Appeals erred in its determination that a permanent improvement was not required to 
invoke Boundary by Estoppel claim. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pgs 14-15 (filed 
August 12,2009). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari as to this 
issue. See Order (November 23, 2009). 
Issue 3: Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the 
3 
doctrine of Boundary by Estoppel does not require a showing of wrongdoing on the part 
of the party sought to be estopped or that it does not require a superior knowledge of the 
material facts on the part of the party sought to be estopped? 
Standard of review: Whether a court applies the appropriate elements to a claim or 
defense is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 
P.2d 1234,1244 (Utah 1998); see also S.S v. State, 972 P.2d 439,440-41 (Utah 1998); 
Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); AX. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
This issue was preserved for appeal insomuch as the Imuses asserted the boundary 
by equitable estoppel claim in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R at 478-48); Rob and Sherri Bahr and lone Senn (hereinafter 
"Bahrs") opposed the Imuses' boundary by equitable estoppel claim in their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R at 664-
667); and the Bahrs argued against the Imuses' boundary by equitable estoppel claim at 
the August 20, 2007 oral argument hearing (R at 1206, pg. 39:7 - 44:20). After an appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Bahrs filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the 
Utah Supreme Court, requesting that certiorari be granted concerning whether the Court 
of Appeals erred in its determination that a Boundary by Estoppel claim does not require 
wrongdoing or superior knowledge on the part of the party sought to be estopped. See 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, pgs 15-19 (filed August 12, 2009). The Utah Supreme 
Court subsequently granted certiorari as to this issue. See Order (November 23,2009). 
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a boundary dispute between neighbors of adjoining parcels 
of property in a residential subdivision. The Imuses bought their property in 
approximately March 1983. In approximately August 1983, a fence was constructed that 
attempted to divide the Imuses' property from the Bahrs' property. The fence was paid 
for by the Imuses and its location was determined by the Imuses and the Bahrs' 
predecessors in interest. The Bahrs bought their home in approximately December 1988 
and questioned the Imuses regarding the fence's location. In or about March 2002, the 
Bahrs hired a contractor to construct an addition onto the side of their home and property 
that is adjacent to the fence and Imus property. The Bahrs' contractor informed the Bahrs 
that, based upon his measurements, the fence encroached upon their property. The Bahrs 
informed the Imuses, on at least two occasions in 2002, that they believed the fence 
encroached upon their property, which the Imuses denied was the case. The parties' 
dispute escalated, which resulted in complaints being filed with Sandy City by the parties 
against one another. In the fall of 2003, the Bahrs, at the recommendation of a Sandy 
City official, obtained a survey, which survey verified that the fence encroached upon the 
Bahrs' property by approximately .2 feet towards the front of their property and 
approximately 4.7 feet at the back of their property. 
B. Proceedings Below 
On or about April 2,2004, the Bahrs filed a Complaint against the Imuses. (R at 
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1.) The Bahrs asserted, among other causes of action, quiet title to the portion of property 
on the Imuses' side of the fence that a survey demonstrated was part of the Bahrs' 
property. (R at 5-9.) On or about May 4, 2004, the Imuses filed their Answer and 
Counterclaim, which Answer asserted the defense of estoppel and Counterclaim asserted 
various causes of action regarding the disputed parcel of property. (R at 19-39.) On or 
about June 2, 2004, the Bahrs filed their Reply to the Counterclaim, which Reply asserted 
the defense of estoppel. (R at 40-50.) On or about January 18, 2005, the Imuses filed an 
Amended Answer and Amended Counterclaim, which Amended Answer asserted the 
defense of estoppel and Amended Counterclaim asserted various causes of action 
regarding the disputed parcel of property. (R at 87-107.) On or about January 25, 2005, 
the Bahrs filed their Reply to the Amended Counterclaim, which Reply again asserted the 
defense of estoppel. (R at 110-119.) Discovery was conducted by the parties. 
On or about January 19, 2007, the Imuses filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Memorandum in Support and Affidavits in Support. (R at 215-486.) On or about January 
31, 2007, the Bahrs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in 
Support. (R at 487-579.) On or about March 1, 2007, the Bahrs filed their Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. (R at 648-800.) On or about April 2, 
2007, the Imuses filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment and their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary 
6 
Judgment. (R at 801-908; R at 921-1028; and R at 1038-11461.) On or about April 30, 
2007, the Bahrs filed their Reply to the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. (R at 1159-1169.) On or about August 20, 2007, a hearing 
was conducted before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan. (R at 1185.) On or about 
September 11, 2007, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision granting the Imuses' 
Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the boundary by equitable estoppel doctrine. 
(R at 1196-1192.) On or about October 16,2007, the Order Granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Compel was entered by the trial court. (R at 1193-1196.) The Bahrs filed their 
Notice of Appeal on November 13, 2007. (R at 1197-1198.) 
On appeal, after full briefing by the parties and oral argument, the Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the Imus' Boundary by 
Estoppel claim. Bohr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, f 1, 211 P.3d 987. In holding thus, the 
Utah Court of Appeals determined that a grant of summary judgment on a Boundary by 
Estoppel claim is reviewed with a "fair degree of deference" to the trial court. Id. at f 5. 
The Court also determined that a Boundary by Estoppel claim does not require a 
permanent improvement to the disputed parcel of land. Id. at f 8. The Court further held 
that a Boundary by Estoppel claim did not require a showing of wrongdoing or superior 
!This appears to be a duplicate filing of the Imuses' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which is first contained in the 
record at pgs. 801-908. 
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knowledge. /</. atffi[9-13. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. In approximately March 1983, the Imuses purchased their property located 
at 2084 Buckingham Way, Sandy, Utah. (R at 235.) 
2. At the time that the Imuses purchased their property, the adjoining property 
at 2074 Buckingham Way was owned by Brent and Brenda Wyman, who are the Bahrs' 
predecessors in interest. (R at 217, f 1; see also R at 676, pg. 26: 23-25.) 
3. Shortly after moving into their home, the Imuses approached Brent and 
Brenda Wyman regarding constructing a fence between their respective properties 
(hereinafter "Fence"), which the Wymans agreed to. (R at 217-218, ffif 2-3.) 
4. The Imuses also approached their other neighbor, Mr. Dalton, about 
building a fence between their respective properties, which Mr. Dalton agreed to. (R at 
710, pg. 31:3-32:2.) 
5. The Imuses, Mr. Dalton and Brent Wyman (but not Brenda Wyman) 
participated in measuring the property lines to locate their respective fences, which 
measurements were completed by using the Imuses' tape measure. (R at 711, pg. 33:2-
20; see also R at 683, pg. 53:9-55:17.) Also, the Imuses, Mr. Dalton and Brent Wyman 
(but not Brenda Wyman) participated in constructing the Fence. (R at 678-679, pgs. 
36:24-37:2.) 
6. During the measurement process, Brent Wyman expressed his desire to 
accurately determine the boundary line. (R at 711, pg. 34:13-18.) Jim Imus assisted 
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Brent Wyman in the measurement of the 2074 Buckingham Way property. (R at 711, pg. 
36:11-13.) 
7. After measurements were completed, the Imuses and Wymans believed that 
the Fence properly marked the boundary between their respective properties. (R at 711-
712, pgs. 34:13-36:13, 37:16-18; see also R at 684, pg 57:10-58:12.) 
8. There is no admissible evidence in the record from Brent Wyman that he 
indicated his belief that the Fence properly marked the boundary between the 2074 and 
2084 Buckingham Way properties.2 Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that the placement of the Fence resolved an actual dispute or disagreement about the 
proper boundary line between the 2074 and 2084 Buckingham Way properties. In short, 
the Imuses or Wymans simply believed the Fence marked the proper location of the 
boundary line between their respective properties, which location had been determined 
through their mutual efforts. 
9. Neither the Imuses nor the Wymans hired a surveyor to assist in locating 
the true boundary line. (R at 712, pg. 38:14-15; see also R at 680, pg. 43:7-8.) 
10. In or around June 1985, the Wymans sold the 2074 E. Buckingham Way 
property to Joe Carlisle, another predecessor in interest to the Bahrs. (R at 248.) 
2Imuses' counsel indicated in the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment the following: "Executed originals of the Wyman affidavits are 
filed separately herewith, and unexecuted copies are attached hereto as Exhibits D and 
E." (R at 463,1f 3.) However, the record does not contain an executed Affidavit of Brent 
Wyman. (R at 222-227). 
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11. In or about December 1988, the Plaintiffs Rob and Sherri Bahr purchased 
the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property from Mr. Carlisle. (R at 727, pgs 12:18-13:6.) 
12. After their purchase of the 2074 E. Buckingham Way property, the Bahrs 
commented to and questioned the Imuses several times over the years that the Fence did 
not appear to be straight and that they believed it encroached upon their property, which 
the Imuses always denied was the case because the Imuses had measured and properly 
placed the Fence on the boundary line when it was installed. (R at 748-749, pgs. 15:23-
18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, pgs. 31:24-
32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; R at 
756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 758-
759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, pgs. 
16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R 
at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R at 782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; 
Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) 
13. Despite the multiple discussions regarding the Fence over the years, the 
parties' disagreement escalated to the point where complaints were filed one against 
another with Sandy City. Id. 
14. Finally, at the recommendation of a Sandy City official, the Bahrs obtained 
a survey that was conducted by Peterson Engineering, P.C. (R at 794; see also R at 742, 
pg. 70:2-16.) 
15. The Peterson Engineering Survey found that the Imuses' side of the Fence 
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contained approximately from .2 feet of the Bahrs' property at the front to approximately 
4.7 feet of the Bahrs' property at the back of their property. (R at 794.) 
16. The Imuses also conducted a survey, which survey found that the Imuses 
had approximately 1.12 feet of the Bahrs' property a few feet from the front to 
approximately 4.37 feet of the Bahrs' property at the back of their property. (R at 796.) 
17. The Imuses have only paid the property taxes for their property as set forth 
in their warranty deed, legal description and based upon the plat map. (R at 693, 
pgs.94:5-95:15.) 
18. The Imuses' use of the disputed property has consisted of using it for 
planting things in it, watering it, caring for it, and enjoying it. (R at 712, pg. 40:6-21.) 
19. No longer having access to the disputed property would impact the Imuses 
through loss of shading and privacy. (R at 713, pg. 41:7-12.) 
20. The Imuses have not submitted any proof that they have made permanent 
improvements to the disputed property, nor have they established when improvements 
were made, nor have they submitted evidence that establishes the value of their property 
with any such improvements versus its value without such improvements. 
21. The Bahrs were bona fide purchasers for value, who took the 2074 E. 
Buckingham Way property without notice of adverse claims or interests to the property. 
(R at 732, pgs. 32:23-33:8.; see also R at 743, pg. 74:9-22.) 
22. There is no evidence in the record that the Bahrs knew or were aware that 
the Imuses were improving the disputed property. 
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The holding of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter should be reversed 
because it is contrary to case law and the public policies underlying these cases. The 
grant of summary judgment in the present matter completely subverts the policies 
underlying the Statute of Frauds and the recording statutes while wholly bypassing other 
narrow and well-delineated boundary doctrines, namely Boundary by Agreement and 
Boundary by Acquiescence. The holding of the Court of Appeals completely swallows 
the Boundary by Acquiescence and Boundary by Agreement doctrines and replaces them 
with one super-doctrine: Boundary by Estoppel. The Court of Appeals has, in essence, 
completely dispelled with the requirement that neighboring landowners acquiesce to a 
boundary for a period of twenty years in Boundary by Acquiescence cases and that the 
parties agree to a boundary line for a long period of time in Boundary by Agreement 
cases. The Court's ruling effectively transfers ownership of real property from one 
neighbor to another the instant that unwitting adjoining landowners construct a poorly 
measured fence and landscape their respective properties. Except in unusual 
circumstances where it is necessary to avoid manifest injustice, it is bad policy to employ 
estoppel in order to effectuate a transfer in title of real property without consideration, 
without a written instrument, and outside of the narrowly carved out exceptions of 
Boundary by Agreement and Boundary by Acquiescence. Accordingly, it is necessary for 
the Court to narrow the pastor in which trial courts may roam in their application of 
Boundary by Estoppel; this may be accomplished by reviewing a finding of Boundary by 
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Estoppel for correctness, by requiring a showing of permanent improvement before 
Boundary by Estoppel may be invoked, and by requiring a showing of wrongdoing and 
superior knowledge on the part of the party being estopped before Boundary by Estoppel 
may be invoked. 
Regarding the standard of review for a Boundary by Estoppel claim, the Court 
should not rely in Irizarry for the proposition that general equitable estoppel claims are 
reviewed with a "fair degree of deference" to the trial Court. Rather, the Court should 
consider the distinct nature of Boundary by Estoppel cases and the important policy 
implications of such cases and apply the Pena factors to fashion a unique standard of 
review of Boundary by Estoppel claims. Balancing the Pena factors, great weight should 
be given to the policy concerns surrounding the boundary doctrines, and in particular to 
the tension between the policies supporting general equitable estoppel and the policies 
protecting the ownership and transfer or real property. The Pena factors weigh in favor 
of narrowing the pasture for trial courts and erecting fences to direct the trial courts in 
their consideration of Boundary by Estoppel issues. Therefore, a Boundary by Estoppel 
claim should be reviewed for correctness, or, in the alternative, with a very small degree 
of deference to the trial court. 
In order to fence in the trial courts and prevent too-casual findings of estoppel, 
there should be a requirement that a party seeking Boundary by Estoppel must make a 
showing of permanent improvements to the disputed parcel of property. The permanent 
improvement requirement would narrow the cases in which the Boundary by Estoppel 
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doctrine may be applied and will work to ensure that the doctrine is only invoked to 
prevent manifest injustice. To be considered permanent in nature, improvements claimed 
by parties claiming Boundary by Estoppel must be substantial, must make the property 
more useful, and must not be readily removable. The requirement of permanent 
improvements and the definition of such proposed by the Bahrs are supported by Utah 
case law, foreign precedent, and secondary sources. 
Further, in order to narrow the pasture in which trial courts may roam, there must 
be a showing of wrongdoing or superior knowledge of relevant facts on the party of the 
party sought to be estopped before Boundary by Estoppel may be invoked. These 
requirements will prevent too-casual findings of estoppel where such an estoppel is not 
absolutely necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Utah authority, foreign authority, and 
secondary authorities all require a showing of wrongdoing or that the party estopped 
possessed superior knowledge of the relevant facts. It does not follow, therefore, that a 
Boundary by Estoppel should be invoked where the parties acted in ignorance where 
neither party committed wrongdoing or neither party had actual knowledge of the true 
boundary line, true boundary line. Allowing an estoppel iin such circumstances would 
reward one party for his negligence while punishing the other party for the same degree 
of negligence. Therefore, for Boundary by Estoppel to be invoked there must be a 
showing of wrongdoing on the part of the party being estopped or actual knowledge of 
the boundary line on the part of the party to be estopped. 
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V, ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON A BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL CLAIM SHOULD BE 
AFFORDED A FAIR DEGREE OF DEFERENCE. 
In the present matter, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment on a Boundary by Estoppel claim presented a mixed question of 
law and fact and therefore that it should grant the trial court a "fair degree of deference" 
on review of the issue. See Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, f 5. The Court of Appeals 
declined to apply the Pena factors, as revised in State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, | f 23-24,42, 
144 P.3D 1096, in order to determine the appropriate standard of review for a Boundary 
by Estoppel claim. Bahr, 2009 UT App at f 5 n.4. In ruling so, the Court of Appeals 
relied on Irizarry for the proposition that a general equitable estoppel claim is reviewed 
with a "fair degree of deference" to the trial court. Bahr, 2009 UT App at^ f 5 (citing to 
State Dep't of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997)). 
In applying the standard of review set forth in Irizarry, the Court of Appeals failed 
to recognize the important distinction between a general equitable estoppel claim and a 
Boundary by Estoppel claim. Estoppel is a malleable doctrine that may be applied in a 
myriad of different circumstances and many of these circumstances would not and do not 
implicate public policy considerations. Boundary by Estoppel, however, implicates 
fundamental public policy concerns regarding the ownership and transfer of real 
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property.3 It is a mistake, therefore, to casually lump Boundary by Estoppel claims 
together with general equitable estoppel claims. The Court should apply the Pena factors 
to determine the appropriate level of review for a Boundary by Estoppel claim. 
In Irizarry, the Court conducted the following analysis in order to determine the 
appropriate standard of review for a general estoppel claim: "[t]he doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is simply stated, yet it is applicable to a wide variety of factual and legal 
situations. The variety of fact-intensive circumstances involved weighs heavily against 
lightly substituting our judgment for that of the trial court." Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 678. 
Whereas the Court did not discuss any policy concerns generally implicated by claims for 
equitable estoppel, it appears that the Court placed an enormous amount of weight on the 
first Pena factor, which is the degree of variety and complexity in the factors to the legal 
rule. See id. The Irizarry Court likely did not discuss the policy considerations in setting 
forth a standard of review of general equitable estoppel claim due to the fact that there are 
so many differing "factual and legal situations" to which the doctrine could generally be 
applied. See id. Given the broad applicability of estoppel claims in general, a discussion 
of policy considerations would have been pointless, if not impossible, during a 
determination of a standard of review for general estoppel claims. It is unfortunate that 
the Court set forth a standard of review for general equitable estoppel claims without a 
3
 Utah Const. Art. I, § 1; Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3; Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-101 et 
seq.\ Alvey Development Corp. v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, f 16, 51 P.3d 45; 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). 
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discussion of policy concerns, since considerations of public policy are seemingly the 
most critical Pena factor. See Levin, 2006 UT at fflf 23, 26 ("Even where a case for 
appellate deference is strong under the first two factors, policy considerations may 
nevertheless lead [the Court] to limit that deference Where society's interest in 
establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs other considerations, [the Court] 
grant[s] no discretion to the trial court, and [the Court] review[s] the mixed question for 
correctness."). 
In the dissenting opinion in Irizarry, then Chief Justice Zimmerman, joined by 
now Chief Justice Durham, urged the Court, given the strong public policy interests 
involved, to fashion a special standard of review applicable only to equitable estoppel 
claims made in the context of child support payments. See Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 685-686 
("where a too-casual finding of estoppel would operate to relieve an unwed father of his 
legal obligation to support his child, in contradiction of public policy, I find it necessary 
to narrow the trial court's pasture"). In light of Irizarry not mentioning policy, in light of 
policy being the most important Pena factor, and in light of the important policy 
implications of Boundary by Estoppel, the Court should apply the Pena factors in the case 
at bar to fashion a special standard of review for Boundary by Estoppel cases. 
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A. BALANCING THE PENA FACTORS, A GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON A BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL 
CLAIM SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS, OR, 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, WITH A VERY SMALL DEGREE 
OF DEFERENCE. 
Even where an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, "the measure of 
discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, with respect to certain issues 
presenting mixed questions of law and fact the Court will grant great deference to the trial 
Court but with regard to other issues the Court will not grant any deference to the lower 
court. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT at 1fl[ 23-24, 42 (refusing to grant the trial Court any 
measure of deference on issue of custodial interrogation). In order to determine the 
appropriate level of deference, if any, the Court weighs the Pena factors, as revised by the 
Court in Levin. Id. at f 25 (eliminating the "novelty" factor). The Court set forth the 
Pena factors as follows:(i) the "degree of variety and complexity in the factors to the 
legal rule;" (ii) the "degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on 
facts observed by the trial judge;" and (iii) "other policy reasons that weigh for or against 
granting discretion to the trial courts." Id. 
Notwithstanding the Court's holding in Irizarry,4 the Boundary by Estoppel 
question here presents additional policy concerns that are not implicated by equitable 
estoppel claims in general and these public policy concerns warrant a Pena analysis 
4State Dep 't of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 
1997). 
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independent of the Court's decision in Irizarry to determine the appropriate level of 
review that should be applied in Boundary by Estoppel cases. In the present matter the 
Pena factors weigh against granting the trial court deference on the issue of Boundary by 
Estoppel. In the alternative, the Pena factors weigh against granting much discretion to 
the trial court. Each of the factors will be addressed in turn below. 
1. THE FACTS RELATING TO BOUNDARY BY 
ESTOPPEL ARE NOT SO COMPLEX AND VARYING 
THAT NO RULE MAY ADEQUATELY BE SPELLED 
OUT. 
Concerning the first Pena factor, the Court weighs the "degree of variety and 
complexity in the factors to the legal rule." Levin, 2006 UT at \ 25. The question under 
this factor is not whether the facts will vary from case to case but whether the facts are 
"so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these 
facts can be spelled out." Id. at If 39. Surely, Boundary by Estoppel is a fact dependant 
analysis and surely the facts relevant to such determinations will vary from case to case; 
however, the facts expected from these determinations, unlike equitable estoppel claims 
in general, are not so complex and varying that no rule can be spelled out. 
The case of Levin is instructive on this first Pena factor. In Levin, the Court found 
that custodial interrogation was not so complex that no rule could be adequately set forth 
to encompass the varying factual circumstances of a given case. While Boundary by 
Estoppel is a fact dependant analysis, custodial interrogation is even more so. In Levin, 
the court held that the fact sensitive determination of custodial interrogation did not 
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warrant deferential appellate review under the first Pena factor because the facts related 
to the issue are relatively simple. Id. at ff 39,42. In order to determine issues of 
custodial interrogation, the Levin court applied the four factor test for custodial 
interrogation outlined in Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664, P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). The four 
Carrier factors required the court to analyze a diverse set of facts including, but not 
limited to, the following: (1) location of the interrogation; (2) indicia of arrest, such as 
whether handcuffs were used, guns were drawn, doors were locked, and threats or 
coercion were used; (3) whether the defendant was the focus of the investigation; and (4) 
whether the police officers should have known that their actions or words were likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. Levin, 2006 UT at \ 39. Such determinations turn on 
whether the setting of the interrogation is custodial or accusatory rather than 
investigatory. Carner, 664 P.2d at 1170. Even though the question of whether a 
Defendant is in custody is highly fact-dependant, the Court concluded that the first Pena 
factor did not weigh in favor of appellate deference because the facts are not too complex 
to carve out a general rule. Levin, 2006 UT at f 39. The Court held that these factors 
provided a well defined rule of law for which they could apply the relevant facts, thus 
resulting in a decision by the trial court that should be reviewed for correctness. 
A determination of Boundary by Estoppel, although fact intensive, is also not so 
complex and varying that a general rule cannot adequately address the issue. The general 
elements of Boundary by Estoppel are: (1) a failure to act that is inconsistent with a claim 
later asserted; (2) reasonable action taken on the basis of a failure to act; and (3) an injury 
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would result from allowing repudiation of such a failure to act. Dahllnv. v. Hughes, 
2004 UT App 391, f 14, 101 P.3d. 83. The Court further requires an element of 
wrongdoing and superior knowledge on the part of the party sought to be estopped. See 
Section III(A) and III(B), infra. Finally, in addition to the above, the Court requires that 
permanent improvements be made on the disputed parcel. Peterson v. Johnson, 34 P.2d 
697, 698 (Utah 1934) (citing Tripp v. Bagley, 276 P. 912 (Utah 1928), and 69 A. L. R. 
1417). 
The relevant facts needed to determine the issue of a custodial interrogation are 
much more fact sensitive than the relevant facts necessary for a determination of 
Boundary by Estoppel. In sum, although the facts relating to Boundary by Estoppel will 
vary from case to case, this first Pena factor weighs against appellate deference because 
the determining facts are not "so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing 
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out." Levin, 2006 UT at % 39 (citing to 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 932. Accordingly, the Court should not grant any deference to the trial 
court, or, in the alternative, should grant only a small degree of deference on the issue of 
Boundary by Estoppel. 
2. THE APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL RULE IN THIS 
MATTER WAS NOT BASED UPON FACTS 
OBSERVED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
With respect to the second Pena factor, the Court looks to the degree to which a 
trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge. Id. at 
f 25. Where the trial court is in a position to observe facts that "cannot be adequately 
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reflected in the record available to appellate courts," there is a greater need for appellate 
deference. Id. at \ 40. In the present matter, however, the trial court is not in a superior 
position to make credibility assessments or to observe other facts because the trial court 
relied upon the same affidavits and exhibits that are before the Court on appeal. 
Moreover, the facts presented here are such that they can be "adequately reflected in a 
cold record." Id. at 140. Consequently, the second Pena factor does not weigh in favor 
of appellate deference and the Court should not grant any deference to the trial court, or, 
in the alternative, should grant only a small degree of deference on the issue of Boundary 
by Estoppel. 
3. PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE COURT SET 
FORTH CONSISTENT STATEWIDE STANDARDS 
REGARDING THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY 
ESTOPPEL. 
Regarding the third Pena factor, the Court considers "other policy reasons that 
weigh for or against granting discretion to the trial courts." Id. at f 25 (internal 
quotations omitted). This third Pena factor is the most critical factor whereas "[e]ven 
where a case for appellate deference is strong under the first two factors, policy 
considerations may nevertheless lead [the Court] to limit that deference." See id. at f 26. 
Accordingly, where the Court finds that, with respect to a particular mixed question, 
"society's interest in establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs other 
considerations, [the Court] grantfs] no discretion to the trial court, and [the Court] 
review[s] the mixed question for correctness." Id. at \ 23. The Court has compared the 
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amount of discretion granted to trial courts by appellate courts to a pasture: 
To the extent that a trial judge's pasture is small because he or 
she is fenced in closely by the appellate courts and given little 
room to roam in applying a stated legal principle to facts, the 
operative standard of review approximates what can be 
described as "de novo." That is, the appellate court closely 
and regularly redetermines the legal effect of specific facts. 
But to the extent that the pasture is large, the trial judge has 
considerable freedom in applying a legal principle to the facts, 
freedom to make decisions which appellate judges might not 
make themselves ab initio but will not reverse — in effect, 
creating the freedom to be wrong without incurring reversal. 
Only when the trial judge crosses an existing fence or when 
the appellate court feels comfortable in more closely defining 
the law by fencing off a part of the pasture previously 
available does the trial judge's decision exceed the broad 
discretion granted. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-938. Where the public policy implications of a given issue are so 
compelling, the Court will limit the pasture. Id. at 938. ("There are situations in which 
we narrow the pasture considerably for policy reasons."). Furthermore, under Pena an 
established standard of review is not necessarily sacrosanct as the Court will "expand or 
contract the size of the pasture in response to things [the Court] learn[s] over time." Id. 
There are strong public policies relating to the ownership, possession, protection 
and transfer of real property. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 1; Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3; Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-3-101 et seq.; Alvey Development Corp. v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 
220, f 16, 51 P.3d 45. The Court has determined that "public policy favors certainty in 
title to real property to protect bonafide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership." 
Alvey Development Corp., 2002 UT App at f 16 (citing Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 
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95, f 13, 977 P.2d 533). The policy of preventing injustice that supports general 
equitable estoppel is in direct conflict with other public policies relating to the ownership, 
possession, protection, and transfer of real property. See Restatement (Third) of Property 
(Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). In light of the strong public policy related to real property and 
the conflict that arises between these policies and the policies supporting equitable 
estoppel, the Court should determine that the third Pena factor weighs heavily against 
granting the trial court deference in a Boundary by Estoppel claim. The Court should 
narrow the pasture in which trial courts may roam in order to avoid too-casual findings of 
Boundary by Estoppel. Consequently, the Court on appeal should review the trial court's 
determination of Boundary by Estoppel for correctness so that the Court may establish 
consistent statewide standards concerning boundary disputes that may be applied 
uniformly by trial courts. 
Also, it is worth noting that reviewing the Boundary by Estoppel defense as a 
matter of law comports with the manner in which the Court reviews determinations of 
boundary disputes made under different boundary fixing doctrines. For example, 
Boundary by Acquiescence determinations are reviewed as a matter of law, even though 
such determinations are highly fact sensitive. Willkinson Family Farm , LLC v. Babcock, 
1999 UT App 366, f 6 (although, given the "highly fact sensitive" nature of the 
determinations, the trial court is afforded "some measure of discretion."). 
In summary, the three Pena factors, when balanced in this matter, weigh strongly 
against appellate deference. The first factor does not weigh strongly in favor of deference 
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because a rule can be fashioned that will adequately capture the varying scenarios 
anticipated in Boundary by Estoppel claims, as opposed to equitable estoppel claims in 
general. With respect to the second factor, the facts relevant to a Boundary by Estoppel 
claim can be adequately reflected in a cold record. Finally, policy interests related to the 
conveyance of real property weigh heavily in favor of narrowing the pasture in which trial 
courts may roam when determining Boundary by Estoppel claims. Consequently, a Pena 
analysis here weighs against granting any deference to a trial court for Boundary by 
Estoppel claims. In the alternative, the Court should grant only a small degree of 
deference on the issue of Boundary by Estoppel. 
B. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE FINDING THAT THE IMUSES 
MADE PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DISPUTED 
PARCEL SHOULD BE REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS. 
Whether permanent improvements were made to the disputed parcel is a question 
of law. A determination of whether a permanent improvement exists is not a fact 
intensive analysis and does not present a mixed question of fact and law. Even when 
there is a mixed question of fact and law, where there is a distinguishable issue that 
presents a question of law, the Court on appeal will review the determination of law for 
correctness and does not grant any deference to the trial court on that issue. See Anderson 
v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, f 13, 176 P.3d 464; see also State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT 
App 517, f 8, 153 P.3d 830. The permanent improvement requirement is unique to 
Boundary by Estoppel claims and does not apply to equitable estoppel generally. See 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, f 14,158 P.3d 1088 (setting forth the 
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basic elements of equitable estoppel). Therefore, in reviewing the Boundary by Estoppel 
claim, the Court should at least review the trial court's finding of a permanent 
improvement for correctness. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT A CLAIM OF BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THAT A PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT BE MADE TO 
THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF REAL PROPERTY. 
Utah recognizes three separate doctrines related to boundary disputes between 
adjoining landowners: Boundary by Estoppel, Boundary by Agreement, and Boundary by 
Acquiescence. Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 n.4 (Utah 1990). The doctrine of 
Boundary by Estoppel has received cursory treatment in comparison to the other 
boundary doctrines. See id. at 423. The doctrine was briefly analyzed in Peterson, 34 
P.2d at 698 and in Tripp, 276 P. at 912, but has hardly received a mention for decades, 
including the period of time during which the doctrines of Boundary by Agreement and 
Boundary by Estoppel were combined and then resurrected as distinct theories. See 
Staker, 785 P.2d at 422-423. 
Estoppel claims are generally disfavored, narrowly and strictly construed, and 
applied by the Court with caution. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 75; 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 41; see also Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 
v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 1377-1378 (Utah 1987) ("we are extremely 
reluctant to apply the doctrine of estoppel against the assertion of rights in a public 
highway by a government entity"). Numerous state courts have set forth statements 
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disfavoring the application of the doctrine and directing that its elements be narrowly 
applied.5 Equitable estoppel is disfavored by the law because the doctrine precludes 
parties from presenting the truth and prevents parties from asserting claims and arguments 
otherwise available at law. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 41 ("no party ought to 
be precluded from making out his case according to its truth unless by force of some 
positive principle of law"); 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 75 ("the doctrine, when 
applied, contravenes the technical, legal rights of the person estopped, stays the operation 
of the usual machinery employed to adjust personal rights, and halts proceedings to make 
certain of justice, and hence is somewhat of a superlaw, arbitrary and penal in nature and 
character"). Due to these concerns, the equitable estoppel doctrine "must be applied 
strictly and should not be enforced unless substantiated in every particular." 28 Am. Jur. 
5Gross v. Sunding, 161 P. 3d 380 (Wash. App. 2007); Moroux v. Toce, 943 So.2d 
1263 (La. App. 2006); Barry Simon Development, Inc v. Hale, 210 S.W.3d 312 (Mo. 
App. 2006); Oster v. Valley County, 140 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2006); Burks v. Elevation 
Outdoor Advertising, LLC, 220 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. App. 2006); B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc. 
v. Wedgeworth, 911 So.2d 483 (Miss. 2005); Makowski v. Waldrop, 584 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. 
App. 2003); Stickney v. City ofSaco, 770 A.2d 592 (Me. 2001); U.S. Outdoor Advertising 
Co., Inc. v. Indiana Dept. ofTransp., 714 N.E.2d 1244 (Ind. App. 1999); McElligott v. 
Lukes, 61A N.E.2d 1108 (Mass. App. 1997); Badgett v. New York Health and Hospitals 
Corp., 641 N.Y.S.2d 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Kruse v. Department of Public Aid, 596 
N.E.2d 743 (111. App. 1992); Gorley v. Parizek, 475 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 991); Dove v. 
Deldado, 808 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1991); Gonzales v. Teskey, 465 N.W.2d 525 (Wis. App. 
1990); International Assn. Of Fire Fighters v. City of San Leandro, 226 Cal.Rptr.23 8 
(Cal. App. 1986); Capital Bank v. Schuler 421 So.2d 633 (Fla. App. 1982); Schneider v. 
Washington, Nat, Ins.Co., 437 P.2d 798 (Kan. 1968); Modern Auto Finance Corp. v. 
Preston, 202 A.2d 845 (Conn. App. 1964); State v. Raymond, 119 N.W.2d 135 (Iowa 
1963); Wisel v. Terhune, 204 P.2d 286 (Okla.1949); Commercial Securities v. Hall, 15 
P.2d483(Or. 1932). 
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2d Estoppel and Waiver § 41. 
Moreover, where an interest in real property is at issue, the Court should be all the 
more cautious in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel. See Restatement (Third) of 
Property (Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). The Court should use caution in its application of 
equitable estoppel affecting interest in real property because the policies supporting 
estoppel are in direct conflict with the strong public policies underlying the Statue of 
Frauds and recording statutes which generally require that a transfer or modification of an 
interest in real property be "evidenced by formal written instruments." See Restatement 
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.6 (2000). Whereas Boundary by Estoppel claims 
necessarily affect interests in real property, the Court should clarify the elements of the 
Boundary by Estoppel claim in order to safeguard the important public policies related to 
interests in real property and to direct the lower courts in resolving disputes that affect 
every property owner in the state. 
While the Court has traditionally paid little attention to Boundary by Estoppel, the 
Court of Appeals failed to recognize the direction of the Supreme Court regarding 
permanent improvements in early cases that dealt with the doctrine. Bahr, 2009 UT App 
at fflf 7-8. Moreover, the Court's decision in the present matter bypasses the doctrines of 
boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence. The court's ruling effectively 
transfers title in real estate at the instant unwitting adjoining landowners construct a 
hastily measured fence and landscape their respective properties. The Court of Appeals' 
decision in the present matter completely swallows the doctrine of Boundary by 
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Acquiescence and replaces it with one super-doctrine: Boundary by Estoppel. As such, 
the Court should take steps to maintain the distinct boundary doctrines that have been 
developed and to ensure that Boundary by Estoppel does not eclipse the other doctrines 
based upon a trial court's too-casual finding of estoppel. Requiring a permanent 
improvement on the part of a party claiming Boundary by Estoppel would maintain the 
unique character of the boundary doctrines and would prevent the doctrine of Boundary 
by Estoppel from swallowing Boundary by Agreement and Boundary by Acquiescence. 
A. TO INVOKE BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL A PARTY MUST 
MAKE A SHOWING THAT A PERMANENT 
IMPROVEMENT WAS MADE TO THE DISPUTED PARCEL. 
In accordance with the foregoing principles, the Court has required permanent 
improvements be made on the disputed parcel before a Boundary by Estoppel claim may 
be established. Peterson, 34 P.2d at 698 ("So far as is made to appear, no permanent 
improvements were placed on the land in question and hence defendant is not in a 
position to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in aid of his claim.") (citing 69 A. L. 
R. 1417); Tripp, 276 P. at 916 ("It is equally obvious that plaintiff is not estopped from 
claiming the land in controversy because of any improvements placed upon the land by 
the defendants."); but see Dahl Inv., 2004 UT App at f 14 (omitting permanent 
improvement requirement from its equitable estoppel analysis). 
Utah's approach conforms with the approaches of several other jurisdictions that 
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list permanent improvements as an element of Boundary by Estoppel.6 Similarly, other 
jurisdictions require "valuable improvements" to a disputed parcel before Boundary by 
Estoppel may be invoked; the difference between "valuable improvements" and 
"permanent improvements" appear to be superficial since "valuable improvements" tend 
to be improvements that are permanent in nature.7 
Moreover, improvements of a permanent nature have been required by courts 
when asserting an estoppel related to other areas affecting interests in real property. For 
example, Utah courts have required "tangible" improvements when invoking an estoppel 
in other areas of property law. See Migliaccio v. Davis, 232 P.2d 195 (Utah 1951) (in an 
action to quiet title in a mining claim, the Court stated the general rule that in order to 
6
 69 A. L. R. 1417; Downing v. Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306, 309 (Idaho 1960); Dart 
v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Iowa 1967) (Boundary by Estoppel requires permanent 
or valuable improvements to the disputed parcel); Gorbics v. Close, 722 S.W.2d 672, 675 
(Tenn.App. 1986); Kincaidv. Morgan, 425 S.E.2d 128,130, 133 (W. Va. 1992) 
(Boundary by Estoppel requires a permanent improvement); Pickett v. Nelson, 37 N.W. 
836, 838 (Wis. 1888) (requiring a permanent improvement to the disputed property for a 
Boundary by Estoppel claim). 
7See Dunn v. Fletcher, 96 So. 2d 257, 262 (Ala. 1957) (stating rule that a valuable 
improvement is required to work an estoppel; valuable improvements include the erection 
of a building, construction of a road and subsequent improvements to the roadbed); see 
also Deidrich v. Simmons, 87 S.W. 649, 650 (Ark. 1905)(valuable improvements to 
disputed parcel required for an estoppel; valuable improvements include the erection of a 
"dwelling house"); see also Halverson v. Village ofDeerwood, 322 N.W.2d 761, 767-768 
(Minn. 1982) (stating that a "valuable improvement" is required for Boundary by 
Estoppel against a government entity; construction of a house constitutes a valuable 
improvement); see also Great Plains Oil & Gas Co. v. Foundation Oil Co., 153 S.W.2d 
452,459 (Tex. 1941) (rejecting an estoppel claim where the party seeking estoppel failed 
to construct "valuable improvements on the land in controversy;" a barbed wire fence is 
not a valuable improvement). 
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assert an estoppel concerning an interest in real property most cases require "tangible" 
improvements be made to the disputed real property; tangible improvements included 
construction of a chute and a loading platform for mining operations) (citing to 19 Am. 
Jur., Estoppel, paragraph 133). Other jurisdictions have required that a permanent 
improvement be made to real property before an estoppel can work to make a license 
irrevocable.8 Similarly, other jurisdictions have required a showing of a permanent 
improvement to real property before an easement by estoppel may be found.9 Further, 
other jurisdictions have required a permanent improvement to disputed property in order 
to overcome the statute of frauds on the basis of estoppel. See Knight v. Stroud, 53 S.E. 
2d 72 (S.C. 1949). Finally, other jurisdictions have refused to enforce a forfeiture clause 
based upon an estoppel claim where a party seeking estoppel made permanent 
improvements to the real property at issue. Hart v. Northeastern N.M. Fair Ass % 265 
* Roberts Constr. Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1976) (a license 
concerning real property becomes irrevocable when party seeking estoppel makes 
"improvements of a permanent character"- quarry equipment was not permanent in nature 
because there was no showing that it was irremovable, or at least, irremovable without 
great expense); Brown v. Eoff, 530 P.2d 49, 50-51 (Or. 1975) ("We have held that one 
who induces another to make significant expenditures for permanent improvements in 
reasonable reliance upon one's promise to allow a permanent use of land is subsequently 
estopped from revoking the license."). 
9Brogden v. Billington, 172 P.2d 332, 335-336 (Okla. 1946) (improvements of a 
permanent nature required for an easement by estoppel; planting trees and landscaping 
property are not improvements of a permanent nature); Union Properties Co. v. Klein, 
333 S.W. 2d 864, 867-868 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960) (to claim an easement by estoppel, a 
party must show that permanent improvements were made to the real property; laying 
pavement is a permanent improvement). 
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P.2d 341, 345-346 (N.M. 1953) (a race track, grandstands, barn, stable, and office 
buildings constituted permanent improvements). If the Court requires a showing of 
permanent improvements when dealing with interests affecting only a few of the sticks in 
the bundle of rights, the Court should require permanent improvements for Boundary by 
Estoppel since the doctrine has the draconian effect of completely dispossessing the title 
owner of all of the sticks in the bundle of rights. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred 
in its determination that a permanent improvement is not required to invoke Boundary by 
Estoppel. 
B, THE IMPROVEMENTS CLAIMED BY THE IMUSES ARE 
NOT OF A PERMANENT NATURE. 
There are few examples of what qualifies as a permanent improvement in Utah. In 
the area of estoppel, the Court has determined that the construction of a chute and a 
loading platform for mining operations constituted a "tangible" improvement. See 
Migliaccio, 232 P.2d at 195 (in an action to quiet title in a mining claim, the Court stated 
the general rule that in order to assert an estoppel concerning an interest in real property 
most cases require "tangible" improvements be made to the disputed real property; 
tangible improvements included construction of a chute and a loading platform for mining 
operations) (citing to 19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, paragraph 133). In Dahl, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that a driveway under construction for eighteen (18) months could serve as 
the basis for an equitable estoppel. CfDahlInvestment Co., 2004 UT App. at fflf 3, 15. 
Another Utah case found the following qualified as permanent improvements as 
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contemplated by a lease agreement: "Tiling in front of premises, board floor with maple 
top, stairs in broken stairway, repair of men's toilet and construction of ladies' toilet and 
connecting them with sewer, changing old wooden steps on West Temple side of building 
to cement, modern electric wiring of No. 79, outside painting, placing floor ventilator, 
and placing paneling inside." Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 104 P.2d 619, 623 (Utah 1940). 
The foregoing cases suggest that to be of a permanent nature, an improvement must be 
substantial and must increase the usefulness of the property. 
Other jurisdictions provide more meaningful guidance, particularly where these 
foreign cases interpret permanent improvements within the context of Boundary by 
Estoppel cases. Sister states have determined that permanent improvements must be more 
substantial than planting trees, shrubs, flowers, and grass. See Town of Oriental v. Henry, 
678 S.E. 2d 703, 709 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting City of Salisbury v. Earnhardt, 107 
S.E. 2d 297 (N.C. 1959) ("It has been held many times that... the planting of trees, 
shrubs, flowers and grass are not such permanent improvements as work an estoppel."); 
see also See Mahrenholz v.AlffUl N.W.2d 847, 851-52 (Iowa 1962) (planted flowers 
and bushes did not qualify as permanent improvements). Similarly, courts have 
determined that superficial changes such as digging ditches do not constitute a permanent 
improvement. Dart v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Iowa 1967); see also Downing v. 
Boehringer, 349 P.2d 306, 309 (Idaho 1960)(construction of an irrigation ditch did not 
qualify as a valuable or permanent improvement sufficient to invoke the equitable 
estoppel doctrine). Similarly, improvements which may be removed are not considered to 
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be permanent in nature. See Mahrenholz, 112 N.W.2d at 851-52 (a patio made of 1000 
bricks laid on the ground in sand did not qualify as permanent improvements); see also 
Gorbics v. Close, 111 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tenn.App. 1986)(a trailer home was not a 
permanent improvement because there was no evidence that it could not be removed). 
Further, improvements intended to divide property are not considered permanent in 
nature. See Kennedy v. Oleson, 100 N.W.2d 894, 900 (Iowa 1960)(The extension of a 
brick wall is not a valuable improvement); see also Gorbics, 111 S.W.2d at 675 (A fence 
was not a permanent improvement); see also Great Plains Oil & Gas Co. v. Foundation 
Oil Co., 153 S.W.2d 452,459 (Tex. 1941) (Barbed wire fence is not a valuable 
improvement); See Mahrenholz, 112 N.W.2d at 851-52 (No estoppel even where the 
parties erected a fence); see also Town of Oriental, 678 S.E. 2d at 709 (quoting City of 
Salisbury, 107 S.E. 2d at 297 ("It has been held many times that the fencing in of a street. 
. . are not such permanent improvements as work an estoppel."); cfKimes v. Libby, 126 
N.W. 869, 870 (Neb. 1910)(a fence was not sufficient to satisfy estoppel). 
In contrast to the foregoing, other jurisdictions have generally only found 
permanent improvements relating to Boundary by Estoppel where the improvements have 
substantially changed the character of the property. Other jurisdictions have routinely 
found that major construction projects like buildings, dwellings, and underground tanks 
constitute permanent improvements. See Hart, 265 P.2d at 345-346 (referring to a race 
track, grandstands, barn, stable, and office buildings as permanent improvements); see 
also Deidrich v. Simmons, 87 S.W. 649, 650 (Ark. 1905) (valuable improvements include 
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the erection of a "dwelling house"); see also Dunn v. Fletcher, 96 So. 2d 257,262 (Ala. 
1957) (construction of a building constituted a permanent improvement); Duffield 
Construction v. Baldwin, 679 N.W.2d 477,479-480; 481(S.D. 2004) (replacement of gas 
station underground gasoline storage tanks constituted permanent improvement); see also 
Forney v. Calhoun County, 5 So. 750,752 (Ala. 1888) ("Every additional brick added to 
the structure was an argument against the defendant's silence and each stroke of the 
carpenter's hammer a voice commanding him to speak."). Other jurisdictions likewise 
found that the improvements that facilitate access are permanent improvements. See 
Dunn, 96 So. 2d at 262 (valuable improvements include construction of a road and 
subsequent improvements to the roadbed); Carleton v. Dierks, 203 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1947) (construction of road with access gates constituted a permanent 
improvement); Duffield Constr, 679 N.W.2d at 479-480; 481 (pouring new concrete 
parking lot constituted permanent improvement). 
Drawing from the above-described cases and from secondary sources, the Bahrs 
propose that, in relation to Boundary by Estoppel cases, the Court adopt the following 
definition of a permanent improvement: an addition or betterment of real property that 
cannot be removed or carried away because it has become physically impossible to 
separate it from the land and that is designed to make the real property more useful, as 
opposed to an ordinary repair or a change that merely gratifies the taste or contributes to 
the convenience of the occupant of the real property. See 41 Am. Jur. 2d Improvements § 
23 ("something done to or put on the land or, in other words, something the occupant 
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cannot remove or carry away with h im, . . . because it has become physically impossible 
to separate it from the land.") (ordinary repairs made to meet the usual wear and tear of 
premises, or changes that merely gratify the taste and contribute to the convenience of the 
occupant are not considered permanent improvements); see also Duffield Constr, 679 
N.W.2d at 481 ("An improvement in construction parlance is ordinarily defined as 'a 
permanent addition or betterment of real property that enhances its capital value and that 
involves the expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the property more 
useful.") (internal citations omitted). 
In applying the above law and guidance to this case, the Imuses have failed to 
establish that any permanent improvements were made to the disputed parcel of property. 
Jim Imus testified to the following regarding what improvements were made to the 
disputed property: 
A. . . . We plant things in it, we water it, we care for it, we enjoy i t . . . . 
Q. . . . What things have you planted in it? 
A. Lots of things. Trees, shrubs, perennials, we've got birth baths on it, 
we've got bird feeders and trees on it, vines, ground covers, lots of 
stuff.... 
Q. If you lose the disputed portion of the land is that going to impact 
your ability to use the other portion of your yard? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How? 
A. By the shading and privacy. 
(R at 712-713, pgs. 40:6-41:12.) Also, nowhere in the record nor in the Imuses statement 
of undisputed facts, as contained in their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, do the Imuses claim the disputed property contains any 
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permanent improvements. (R at 463-470.) The Imuses' sole improvement to the 
disputed property, as claimed in their Memorandum, is "landscaping."11 (R at 468, f 24.) 
Planting trees, shrubs, flowers and other vegetation does not qualify as a permanent 
improvement. The additions described by the Imuses can be readily removed, gratify 
only the taste or convenience of the Imuses, and do not improve the usefulness of the 
property. Nor does the potential loss of shading and privacy act as a sufficient basis to 
invoke the boundary by equitable estoppel doctrine. Based upon these deficiencies, in 
addition to the other arguments contained herein, the Imuses' boundary by equitable 
estoppel claim should be denied and this matter reversed and remanded to the trial court. 
10Important to note in reading the Imuses5 statement of undisputed facts is the 
Imuses refer to their entire yard as "property" and the portion of their yard in dispute as 
the "Disputed Parcel." (R at 466-467, f 18.) 
nImuses claim they "constructed improvements on their property up to the 
Boundary Fence." (R at 464, f 7.) Imuses also claim "[mjoving the boundary at this 
point would not only require the Imuses to incur significant expense, but would cause 
them significant inconvenience, as irrigation systems would have to be relocated, their 
storage shed would have to be removed altogether, and they would lose virtually all of the 
irreplaceable mature landscaping on the west side of their property." (R at 468, f 23.) 
Despite these broad assertions, there are several note worthy problems when applied to 
the boundary by equitable estoppel. First, no evidence exists in the record to document 
what "significant expense" would be incurred to move the Fence to the proper boundary 
line. Second, in regards to inconvenience, the Imuses fail to inform the court that the 
irrigation systems that must be relocated are not underground, but are hanging from the 
Fence and can be easily moved with the fence. (R at 323.) Finally, the storage shed is 
not on the "Disputed Parcel", as reflected by both surveys. (R at 559, 561.) 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT A CLAIM OF BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL DOES NOT 
REQUIRE WRONG DOING OR SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE ON 
THE PART OF THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE ESTOPPED. 
As noted above, estoppel claims are generally disfavored, narrowly and strictly 
construed, and applied by the Court with caution. See Section II, supra. Courts and 
commentators alike disfavor the doctrine whereas the doctrine precludes parties from 
arguing all of the relevant facts and asserting claims and arguments otherwise available at 
law. See Section II, supra. The Court of Appeals excluded the elements of wrongdoing 
and knowledge of facts from consideration in Boundary by Estoppel claims, thus 
expanding and broadening the application of that boundary doctrine beyond the 
application of equitable estoppel in general. Further, in light of the disfavored nature of 
the estoppel doctrine in general, the Court of Appeals erred in its broad construction of 
Boundary by Estoppel which allows the doctrine to be liberally applied by trial courts. 
The requirements of wrongdoing and knowledge of facts bridle the already expansive 
doctrine, and narrow the pasture in which trial judges are free to roam when making 
Boundary by Estoppel determinations. These requirements are discussed in turn below. 
A. ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE INVOKED UNLESS THERE IS AN 
ELEMENT OF WRONGDOING ON THE PART OF THE 
PARTY SOUGHT TO BE ESTOPPED. 
Whereas estoppel is a doctrine of equity, the purpose of the doctrine is to 
effectuate justice or to prevent an injustice. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 75. In 
Utah, estoppel is: 
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[A] doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss a party who has, 
without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect 
of another.... Estoppel arises when a party. . . by his acts, representations, 
or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence, induces another . . . to believe certain facts to 
exist and that such other. . . acting with reasonable prudence and diligence, 
relies and acts thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the former... is 
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. 
Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697. 
In interpreting this rule the court has determined that it is fundamental that there be 
actual wrongdoing on the part of the party who is sought to be estopped. See 
Youngblood, 2007 UT at % 15; see also Morgan v. BD. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1976); see also Kelly v. Richards, 83 P.2d 731, 734 (1938) (equitable estoppel is 
only invoked when the conduct and circumstances would otherwise perpetrate a fraud or 
unfair advantage). For equitable estoppel to be invoked, there must be an actual fraud or 
misrepresentation of fact. Youngblood, 2007 UT at f 15; Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 
1113,1115 (Utah 1985); Kelly, 83 P.2d at 734; Roy v. Cunningham, 731 P.2d 526 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1986)(requiring that the party claiming Boundary by Estoppel must have been 
misled); Jefferson Life & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 120 So.2d 160, 163 (Miss. 1960); Great 
Plains Oil & Gas Co., 153 S.W.2d at 459 (requiring conduct or statements calculated to 
mislead the party claiming an estoppel regarding an interest in real property); Oklahoma 
v. Texas, 268 U.S. 252, 257 (1925) ("only where conduct or statements are calculated to 
mislead a party and are acted upon by him in good faith to his prejudice can he invoke 
them as a basis of such an estoppel."); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 47. 
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Accordingly, silence or inaction, standing alone, cannot form the basis of quitable 
estoppel. See IHC Health Servs. v. D & KMgmt., Inc., 2003 UT 5, f 11, 73 P.3d 320; see 
also Barnard, 700 P.2d at 1115; 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 60 ("mere silence 
or inaction is generally not a ground for estoppel, unless there is a duty to speak or ac t . . . 
[tjhere must be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence or 
inaction by which the other party is misled to his injury."). Moreover, the Court has 
determined that "estoppel by acquiescence is applicable when 'it would be 
unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which 
he . . . has acquiesced/" IHC Health Servs., 2003 UT at 1f 11 (quoting 28 Am. Jur. 2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 57 (1966)). A party, therefore, may not invoke the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel when that party is at fault for his own circumstances. See Masters v. 
Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697 
("equitable estoppel may be invoked only to aid a party who, without fault of his or her 
own, was 'deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of another'"); see also 
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984) ("he who seeks equity must do 
equity"); see also Rohr v. Rohr, 709 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1985) ("equity refuses to lend 
its aid to a party whose conduct is inequitable"); see also Jefferson Life & Cas. Co., 120 
So.2d at 163 ("a party cannot predicate an estoppel in his favor on his own dereliction, 
omission, or inadvertence where there is no concealment, misrepresentation, or other 
inequitable conduct on the part of the other party"); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and 
Waiver § 40 ("It is fundamental that a person cannot predicate an estoppel in his favor on 
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his own dereliction, omission, or inadvertence where there is no concealment, 
misrepresentation, or other inequitable conduct by the other party"); see also 28 Am. Jur. 
2d Estoppel and Waiver § 52 ("as a general rule, a person will not be permitted to take an 
advantage of, or to question the validity of, propriety of, any act of another which was 
committed upon his own request or was caused by his own conduct"). 
In the present matter, there has been no fraud or misrepresentation of fact by the 
Bahrs or their predecessors in interest, the Wymans. The Imuses have never even alleged 
such. There certainly was no persuasion in this matter of the sort envisioned by 
Youngblood where an ill-intending party represented facts to be one way to get the 
innocent party to agree, and then changed positions later to the innocent party's 
detriment. See Youngblood, 2007 UT at f 15. To the contrary, in the instant case, the 
Imuses directly contributed to their own circumstances. At worst, the Bahrs can be 
accused of mere silence; however, the Bahrs dispute that they were actually silent. 
In the present matter, the Imuses approached the Bahrs' predecessors in interest, 
the Wymans, and asked if the Wymans would be interested in placing a fence between 
their respective properties, to which the Wymans agreed. (R at 217-218, fflf 2-3.) Jim 
Imus assisted Brent Wyman in the measurement of the 2074 Buckingham Way property 
in an effort to determine the proper boundary line to place the Fence. (R at 711, pg. 
36:11-13.) After measurements were completed, the Imuses and Wymans both believed 
that the Fence properly marked the boundary between their respective properties. (R at 
711-712, pgs. 34:13-36:13, 37:16-18; see also R at 684, pg 57:10-58:12.) No survey was 
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ever obtained. (R at 712, pg. 38:14-15; see also R at 680, pg. 43:7-8.) Unfortunately, as 
was later determined, the Imuses and Wymans had made a mistake12 in their 
measurements, which resulted in the misplacement of the Fence. After the Bahrs 
acquired their property, the Bahrs commented to and questioned the Imuses several times 
over the years that the Fence did not appear to be straight and that they believed it 
encroached upon their property; the Imuses repeatedly denied the allegations, claiming 
that they had measured and properly placed the Fence on the boundary line at the time it 
was originally installed. (R at 748-749, pgs. 15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-
25; R at 751, pgs. 26:19-27:5; R at 752, pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R 
at 754, pg. 41:8-13; R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 
50:14-51:17; R at 758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, 
pgs. 129:24-130:4; and see also R at 728, pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 
730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-
71:2; and see also R at 782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; R at 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1.) 
The Wymans' conduct or statements, as outlined above, cannot be construed as 
fraud or misrepresentation. Likewise, the Bahrs9 conduct and statements do not constitute 
fraud or misrepresentation. The record is devoid of any evidence that there was ever a 
dispute or disagreement about the boundary line that was to have been resolved by the 
12The party most responsible for this mistake, if there is any fault, appears to have 
resulted by the Imuses' failure to properly locate and measure their own property, as 
reflected in their survey obtained after this action was initiated. (R at 561.) 
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placement of the fence. Instead, the Imuses and the Wymans simply did not know about 
the true boundary line or care enough to discover the true boundary line at the time of the 
Fence's construction. The parties had equal knowledge concerning the actual location of 
the boundary line and they all had the same opportunity to discover the true location of 
the boundary. By participating in all aspects of the construction of the fence and by 
intentionally or negligently misleading the Bahrs concerning the true boundary line, the 
Imuses' directly contributed to their own supposed injuries such that it cannot be said that 
they are without fault. In short, the decision of the Court of Appeals to not require 
wrongdoing punishes the Bahrs for their own negligence and the negligence of their 
predecessors in interest but, at the same time, rewards the Imuses for their own 
negligence and unwillingness to discover the true boundary line. This outcome seems 
inherently unfair and contradictory to the policies upon which the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel is based. Therefore, it was error for the Court to affirm a finding of Boundary by 
Estoppel where there has not been a showing of wrongdoing on the part of the party being 
estopped. 
B. BOUNDARY BY ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED 
AGAINST AN OWNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS A 
SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRUE BOUNDARY 
LINE. 
The trial court erred in its application of the equitable estoppel doctrine where the 
Bahrs did not have actual knowledge or even any knowledge of the true boundary line. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is only applicable where the party who is sought to be 
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estopped acted with actual knowledge of the relevant facts. See Barnard, 700 P.2d at 
1115(refiising to apply equitable estoppel where there was nothing in the record to 
suggest that the party to be estopped had knowledge of the deficiencies in the legal 
description of deed); see also Wetland v. Turkelson, 118 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1955) (to state a claim for estoppel there must be a showing that "the real 
owner, who encourages the expenditure by his silence, must know the land belongs to 
him and not to the other."); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 45. 
The Utah rule referenced in Barnard, is consistent with the majority rule outlined 
in American Jurisprudence, Second Edition. American Jurisprudence summarizes the 
majority rule which states that "for estoppel to apply, the party against whom the estoppel 
is asserted must have acted with full knowledge of the material facts and his rights or 
have knowledge at the time the representations are made that the representations are 
untrue, or at least that he should have had the means at hand of knowing all the facts, or 
have been in such a position that he ought to have known them." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel 
and Waiver § 45. In the present matter, there are no facts in record to suggest that the 
Bahrs had actual knowledge of the true boundary line until they obtained a survey. (R at 
794; see also R at 742, pg. 70:2-16.) Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in its 
affirmation of the trial court's application of equitable estoppel and its ruling should be 
reversed. 
Similarly, the Utah Court has determined that a party is precluded from invoking 
equitable estoppel where the material facts were equally within the knowledge of both the 
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party invoking the doctrine and the party against whom the estoppel is sought. Barnard, 
700 P.2d at 1115-1116. This comports with the majority approach as it concerns the 
importance of parties' respective knowledge concerning the true property line. Generally 
speaking, "mere silence" during the construction of improvements to real property cannot 
form the basis of an estoppel where the party seeking an estoppel "is perfectly acquainted 
with his rights, or has the means of becoming so." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Improvements § 26; 
see also Oklahoma, 268 U.S. at 257-258 ("Where the condition of the title is known to 
both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no 
estoppel."). Similarly, the majority opinion is that an estoppel may only be found where 
"the means of knowledge of the true title are closed to the occupying claimant." Id. 
With respect to Boundary by Estoppel in particular, at least one commentator has 
noted that "in most cases, the true owner must have known that his representations were 
erroneous or must have been grossly negligent in making them." James H. Backman, The 
Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an Adverse Possession 
Remedy, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 957,968 (hereinafter "Backman"). The Backman article 
has received considerable attention from the Utah Court when resolving boundary 
disputes. In the seminal boundary dispute case of Stoker, the Court relied upon Backman 
for its recitation of the various boundary doctrines and their accompanying elements. See 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417,423 n.4 (Utah 1990). The Stoker Court further relied 
in part upon Backman's criticism of the objective uncertainty requirement to overturn 
Halladay and its progeny. See id. at 421 n.2,423-424 (overturning Halladay v. Cluff 685 
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P.2d 500 (Utah 1984) with regard to the objective uncertainty requirement of Boundary 
by Acquiescence claims). 
The case of Barnard is particularly instructive on the extent to which the 
knowledge of the respective parties creates or defeats an estoppel. In Barnard, a son sued 
his mother to specifically enforce an oral land sales contract between them. Barnard, 700 
P.2d at 1114. The trial court refused to specifically enforce the oral contract because it 
deemed the contract "too indefinite to permit specific enforcement." Id. On appeal, the 
son argued that his mother should be equitably estopped from asserting any deficiency in 
the title description in her defense against him because "she accepted full payment of the 
purchase price, failed to inform [him] of the warranty deed to Paul, and allowed [him] to 
believe he had a binding contract to buy the land." Id. at 1115. In denying the son's 
equitable estoppel argument against his mother the court stated the following: 
The description of the land to be conveyed under the parol agreement, 
however, was equally within the knowledge of both [son] and [mother]. 
There is nothing on the record even implying that [mother] knew the 
contract was unenforceable because of a deficiency in the description of 
land. . . . [Son] has failed to establish even a prima facie basis for applying 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel here . . . . Further, since the property 
description in the oral agreement between [mother] and [son] was equally 
within their knowledge, [son] could not have relied on any 
misrepresentation by Ruth as to the land to be conveyed under the 
agreement. Moreover, nothing in the record implies that there was any such 
misrepresentation by [mother]. Thus, there is no basis for applying the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case. 
Id. at 1115-16. 
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In this case, much like in Barnard, the true boundary line was equally within the 
knowledge of the parties and either party could have commissioned (and eventually each 
of the parties did commission) a survey to set forth the true boundary line according to the 
legal description of the adjoining properties. (R at 794, 796.) In the present matter, the 
Imuses had, at a minimum, equal knowledge with the Bahrs and their predecessors in 
interest about all aspects of the boundary.13 The Imuses, therefore, did not rely on any 
negligent or intentional misrepresentations by anyone to any more or less degree than 
they relied upon their own negligent or intentional actions. In fact, the Imuses misled the 
Bahrs about the true boundary line, claiming at each inquiry from the Bahrs that the 
Imuses had properly measured and placed the fence on the true boundary line.14 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that Boundary by Estoppel 
may be invoked where the true nature of the boundary line is equally within the 
knowledge of the parties. 
13R at 678-679, pgs. 36:24-37:2; R at 711, pg. 33:2-20; see also R at 683, pg. 53:9-
55:17. 
14R at 748-749, pgs. 15:23-18:12; see also R at 749, pg. 21:10-25; R at 751, pgs. 
26:19-27:5; R at 752, pgs. 31:24-32:21; R at 753, pgs. 34:20-35:11; R at 754, pg. 41:8-13; 
R at 755, pgs. 44:7-45:22; R at 756, pgs. 46:7-49:15; R at 757, pgs. 50:14-51:17; R at 
758, pgs. 55:19-57:7; R at 758-759, pgs. 57:20-59:21; R at 776-777, pgs. 129:24-130:4; 
and see also R at 728, pgs. 16:23-17:9; R at 729, pgs. 20:6-21:5; R at 730, pgs. 22:5-23:3; 
R at 733, pgs. 34:20-24; R at 741, pg. 66:9-20; R at 742, pgs. 70:2-71:2; and see also R at 
782-783, pgs. 13:7-15:6; Rat 784, pgs. 18:19-19:1. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals erred in its determination that a grant of summary judgment 
on a Boundary by Estoppel claim should be reviewed with a "fair degree of deference." 
It was error for the Court of Appeals to rely on Irizarry because whereas that case dealt 
with a review of general equitable estoppel. Unlike general equitable estoppel cases, 
Boundary by Estoppel cases implicate serious and fundamental policy concerns regarding 
the ownership and transfer of real property. Accordingly, the Court should have applied 
the Pena factors and should have given great weight to policy factor in determining the 
appropriate standard of review. In balancing the Pena factors, findings of Boundary by 
Estoppel should be reviewed for correctness, or, in the alternative, should be reviewed 
with a very small degree of deference. 
The Court of Appeals erred in its holding that a claim of Boundary by Estoppel 
does not require a showing that the party seeking estoppel made s permanent 
improvement to the disputed parcel. This holding is contrary to Utah authority, foreign 
authorities, and secondary authorities. Further, the Court's determination undermines the 
policies supporting these authorities. A permanent improvement should be required in 
order to invoke Boundary by Estoppel to safeguard the rights of title owners and to ensure 
that the doctrine is only employed to prevent manifest injustice. 
The Court of Appeals likewise erred in finding that a party claiming Boundary by 
Estoppel need not make a showing of wrongdoing or superior knowledge on the part of 
party being estopped. These requirements are not only required by precedent (binding 
48 
and otherwise) but also are necessary to ensure that the doctrine is not used in situation 
where it is not required by justice. Allowing an estoppel in such circumstances would 
reward one party for his negligence while punishing the other party for the same degree 
of negligence. Therefore, for Boundary by Estoppel to be invoked there must be a 
showing of wrongdoing on the part of the party being estopped or actual knowledge of 
the boundary line on the part of the party to be estopped. 
DATED this JT^day of January, 2010. 
KELLY & BRAMWELL, P.C. 
StevenMTKelly 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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ROB BAHR, et al.; : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, : Case No. 040906808 
v. : Judge PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
JIM IMUS, et al., : Date: September 11, 20 07 
Defendants. : 
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production of Documents and Request for Attorney 
Fees, and the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7. 
The parties argued these Motions to the Court on August 20. Having considered the arguments of the 
parties, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Motions should be DENIED and Defendants' Motion 
should be GRANTED. The reasons for this decision are set forth more fully below. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
The Court relies only on the undisputed facts as a basis for its ruling. The Court acknowledges 
that there are disputed facts between the two parties regarding several of the theories alleged in the 
Complaint and Counterclaim. However, those factual disputes are not material to the Court's ultimate 
resolution of this case. A brief summary of the undisputed material facts before the Court is: 
1. Defendants Jim and Melodee Imus have lived in their current home at 2084 E. Buckingham Lane 
in Sandy, Utah, since March of 1983. 
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2. In the summer of 1983, the Imuses met with their neighbors, the Wymans, who owned the 
property adjacent-to the west of the Imuses, to discuss building a boundary fence along the 
property line dividing the two residential properties. 
3. Though the lots were located in a platted subdivision and the neighbors consulted a plat map, the 
parties did not know the precise location of the boundary line between their properties, nor did 
they obtain a survey.1 
4. The Imuses and Wymans then established a boundary line and the Imuses proceeded to construct 
a redwood fence on the agreed upon boundary line separating the two properties. 
5. The Imuses and Wymans thereafter treated this fence as a boundary between their properties and 
the Imuses installed improvements, landscaping and irrigation systems on their side of the fence. 
6. In 1984, the Wymans sold their property to Joe Carlisle, who also treated this fence as a boundary 
line between the properties until he sold the property to the Plaintiffs, Rob and Sherri Bahr, in 
December of 1988. 
7. No change in the treatment of the boundary line by the parties occurred until sometime in 2002 
or 2003.2 
1
 The Defendants neighbors to the east, the Daltons, also participated in measuring the 
properties and establishing the fence lines. 
1
 The parties disagree about when the Plaintiffs first began to dispute the fence as the 
boundary line. This is one of the key factual disputes in this case, though, as will be discussed 
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8. During this 20 or near 20 year period, the Defendants, in addition to installing a sprinkler system, 
landscaped the property to their liking, which included admitted costs of improvements of $7,000 
to $9,000.3 
SUMMARY TUDGMENT MOTIONS 
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on their claim of boundary by 
agreement and further argue that the Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming that the boundary fence does not 
mark the true boundary between the properties. The Plaintiffs counter that they are entitled to have title to 
the property quieted in them because none of the Defendants' Counterclaims has merit Additionally, the 
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' slander and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims. However, at the hearing, the Plaintiffs stipulated that their slander 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims should be dismissed. 
At the outset, the Court notes that the elements and ramifications of this State's rulings on the various 
doctrines at issue, specifically, boundary by agreement, boundary by estoppel, and boundary by 
acquiescence, and their interrelation with each other, are less than models of clarity. See Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984), and Tripp v. Bagley, 
75 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). Not withstanding the Defendants' argument that boundary by agreement 
does not require a long period of time, the scant case law of the State regarding this matter indicates 
otherwise. Although the appellate courts have treated boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence 
3
 In paragraph 3 of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs assert that total costs for all their 
improvements, including a koi pond, storage shed, and other landscaping, would be greatly in 
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as separate doctrines, as a practical matter, there seems to be little distinction between them. Therefore, the 
Court determines to consider the Defendants' claim of boundary by estoppel first and does so in light of the 
appellate courts5 decisions regarding boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence. Because the 
estoppel claim disposes of the action, the Court declines to attempt to resolve the difficult issue presented 
by the case law regarding boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence.4 
Boundary by estoppel "requires the combination of acts or representations by the original 
landowner and reliance by a neighbor on those representations in order to establish a boundary.n Staker, 
785 P.2d at 423 n.4. "Equitable estoppel reflects circumstances where it is not fair for a party to 
represent facts to be one way to get the other to agree, and then change positions later to the other's 
detriment." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, 115, 158 P.3d 1088. The Defendants 
argue that the elements of equitable estoppel in establishing a property line boundary are (1) an action 
or failure to act that is inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) an action or failure to act that is 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; and (3) a showing that injury would result from allowing 
repudiation of such action or failure to act. See Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, ^ [14, 
101 P.3d 830. In order to show "reasonable action" and injury, the Defendant needs to show that 
"permanent improvements were placed on the land in question/' Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 93 
(Utah 1934). 
The Court finds that the Defendants have satisfied the elements of boundary by estoppel and so 
are entitled to ownership of the disputed property. In the present case, the undisputed evidence shows 
that the original landowners, the Wymans and the Lnuses, represented to one another that the boundary 
4
 Additionally, the Court does not need to consider if the Defendants other claims of 
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they established was the property line between their respective lots. In reliance on those mutual 
representations, the Imu^es built the fence as property line marker and then installed improvements on the 
property such as a shed, koi pond, and landscaping up to the fence line. The Wymans never objected to the 
Imuses or raised any complaint. After the Plaintiffs acquired the property formerly owned by the Wymans, 
at least for time, they did nothing to prevent the Defendants from maintaining and adding further 
improvements, such as vegetation and fixtures to the property at issue. 
The Court finds that Dahl Investments is instructive in this case. Dahl Investment primarily 
involved a boundary by acquiescence. In Dahl Investment, a fence stood between the two properties at 
issue for approximately 40 years, from 1925 to 1965 and the parties treated this fence as the boundary. 
However, after the fence had deteriorated, the defendant constructed a driveway which crossed over the 
original fence line. The plaintiff had not objected to the defendant building the driveway during its 
construction. The court held that the plaintiff had established a boundary by acquiescence to the fence 
line boundary and this boundary did not disappear once it had been established, even though the fence 
had not been maintained. 2004 UT App 391, at \\\. However, the court also held that, although the 
plaintiff had established that it was entitled to the boundary originally established by the fence, the 
plaintiff was estopped from claiming the portion of the property occupied by the driveway. Id. at \\5. 
The defendant was entitled to ownership of the driveway because removal of the driveway would 
constitute injury to the defendants. Id. 
Just as in Dahl Investments, the Court finds that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs may have been legally entitled to have the plat map boundary established as 
the legal boundary but that their actions (and the actions of their predecessors) estop them from asserting 
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established by the original owners, the Wymans, and not disputed for many years by the Plaintiffs. 
Additionally, the Court finds that the Defendants would be injured if Plaintiff were allowed to take 
possession of the disputed portion of property. It would inequitable to now allow the Plaintiffs to assert that 
the fence line is not the true boundary between the properties and the Plaintiffs are now estopped from doing 
so. 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel has been made obsolete by the Court's 
ruling on the Summary Judgment Motions. JrJowever, the Court also finds that the Plaintiffs' Motion 
is without merit. Defendants have asserted that they have turned over all the requested documents in 
their possession. The Court is not persuaded at this point that Defendants have acted in bad faith or have 
been dishonest with the Court regarding disclosure of the requested materials. Therefore, the Court 
holds that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel must be denied. 
ORDER 
Defendants are to prepare an appropriate order based on the foregoing decision. 
DATED this^Zday of September, 2007. 
PAUL 
DISTRI 
BAHR V. IMUS PAGE 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, 
to the following, t h i s / ^ day of September, 2007 
Jared L. Bramwell 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
11576 S. State Street #203 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Robert J. Dale 
Christian D. Austin 
Attorneys for Defendants 
215 S. State Street, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this YZ' day of August, 2009,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Robert J. Dale 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Jim Imus & Melodie Imus 
215 South State, Twelfth Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
23 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Rob Bahr, Sherri Bahr, and 
lone Senn, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Jim Imus and Melodee Imus, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070933-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 11, 2009) 
2009 UT App 155 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 040906808 
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan 
Attorneys: Jared L. Bramwell and Steven M. Kelly, Draper, for 
Appellants 
Robert J. Dale and Christian D. Austin, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and McHugh. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
fl Plaintiffs Rob and Sherri Bahr and lone Senn (collectively 
the Bahrs) appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants Jim and Melodee Imus establishing the 
boundary line between the Bahrs" and Imuses1 properties based on 
a theory of boundary by estoppel. Specifically, the Bahrs argue 
that summary judgment was inappropriate because there are 
material facts in dispute and the Imuses are not entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 The Imuses purchased their home in 1983. Later that year, 
the Imuses consulted with their neighbors, the Wymans, who lived 
in the adjacent home directly west of the Imuses, about 
constructing a boundary fence (the fence) between their 
properties. The Wymans were unable to contribute financially, 
but agreed to the fence construction. Although the Imuses appear 
to have carried the financial burden of the fence project, the 
Wymans assisted with the measurements for placement of the fence 
on the boundary line and with the manual labor necessary to build 
the fence. Neither party knew, nor did they obtain a survey to 
determine, the exact boundary between their respective 
properties. There were, however, stakes and marking pins 
utilized by the Imuses and the Wymans. They worked together to 
measure and establish a boundary line, along which they 
ultimately built the fence. The Imuses and the Wymans treated 
the fence as the boundary between their properties thenceforth, 
and the Imuses subsequently installed "improvements, landscaping, 
and irrigations systems on their side of the fence."1 Shortly 
thereafter, the Wymans sold their property to Joe Carlisle, who 
also treated the fence as the boundary line until he sold the 
property to the Bahrs in December 1988. 
if3 Some time in 2003, a dispute arose between the Bahrs and the 
Imuses regarding a Russian Olive tree growing on the Imuses1 side 
of the fence. This dispute led to deterioration of the parties' 
relationship. Soon thereafter, the Bahrs complained to city 
officials and commissioned a survey of their property. This 
survey revealed that the fence deviated from the true property 
line and encroached upon the Bahrs' property from a few inches at 
the front of the property to nearly five feet at the rear, 
creating a pie-shaped parcel of land (Disputed Property) over 
which this dispute centers. Based largely on this survey, the 
Bahrs sued the Imuses praying for relief based upon several 
separate legal theories including trespass, private nuisance, and 
quiet title.2 After discovery was conducted, the Imuses filed a 
motion for summary judgment arguing that, based on the undisputed 
material facts, they are entitled to ownership of the Disputed 
Property because the boundary was established either by agreement 
or acquiescence, or in the alternative, that the Bahrs should now 
be estopped from challenging the boundary.3 The Bahrs responded, 
arguing that summary judgment was not appropriate because there 
Although the parties dispute the "value" of the 
improvements the Imuses installed over the years, the actual cost 
of the improvements appears to be in the $7000 to $9000 range. 
2The Bahrs' complaint also contained claims for slander and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress that were dismissed 
by stipulation prior to resolution of the summary judgment 
motions. 
3In addition to the Imuses1 motion, the Bahrs filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment and a motion to compel. At the 
hearing to resolve all pending motions, the trial court denied 
the Bahrs' motions. Only the grant of the Imuses' motion is at 
issue in this appeal. 
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are material facts in dispute and the Imuses are not legally 
entitled to a judgment based upon any of their asserted legal 
theories. 
1(4 The trial court determined that the material facts are 
undisputed and that equity requires that the Bahrs be estopped 
from now disputing the boundary. Accordingly, the trial court 
granted the Imuses' motion for summary judgment based on 
equitable estoppel. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H5 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Imuses based on an 
equitable estoppel theory.4 We "review[] a trial court's legal 
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for 
correctness . . . view[ing] the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And, although 
"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is simply stated, . . . it 
is applicable to a wide variety of factual and legal 
situations. . . . Therefore, we properly grant the trial court's 
decision [thereon] a fair degree of deference." Department of 
Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 
1997) . 
ANALYSIS 
f6 Granting a party's request for summary judgment is 
appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additionally, "Utah law 
does not allow a summary judgment movant to merely point out a 
lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's case, but instead 
requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence 
4The Bahrs argue that we should take this opportunity to 
apply the factors set forth in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 
1994), see id. at 935-939, to determine the correct standard of 
review for equitable estoppel claims. However, we find such an 
analysis to be unnecessary because the standard of review for the 
determination of equitable estoppel is established. Cf. 
Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 
676, 678 (Utah 1997) (applying the Pena factors and determining 
the appropriate standard of review for equitable estoppel 
determinations). 
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establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact." 
Orvis, 2008 UT 2, % 16. Utah case law establishes that "[t]he 
elements of equitable estoppel are '(i) a . . . failure to act 
[that is] inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) 
reasonable action . . . taken . . . on the basis of the . . . 
failure to act; and (iii) injury . . . would result from allowing 
[a repudiation of] such . . . failure to act.'" Dahl Inv. Co. v. 
Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, 1 14, 101 P.3d 830 (alterations and 
omissions in original) (quoting CECO Corp. v. Concrete 
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989)); see also 
Black's Law Dictionary 571 (7th ed. 1999) (defining equitable 
estoppel as "[a] defensive doctrine preventing one party from 
taking unfair advantage of another when, through false language 
or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another person 
to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person 
has been injured in some way" (emphasis added)). The Bahrs also 
cite Peterson v. Johnson, 84 Utah 89, 34 P.2d 697 (1934), and 
argue that in the boundary dispute context, Utah law requires a 
party asserting equitable estoppel to show that they have made 
permanent improvements to the property in dispute. To adequately 
evaluate this contention, we examine Peterson more closely. 
1(7 In Peterson, the supreme court addressed a boundary dispute 
between two adjacent property owners in rural Utah regarding 
ownership of approximately one acre of land situated between 
their respective properties. See id. at 697. At the heart of 
the dispute in Peterson was a fence separating the properties 
that had allegedly long-established the boundary line. See id. 
In dicta and without elaboration, the supreme court stated that 
equitable estoppel did not support the defendant's claim: "So 
far as is made to appear, no permanent improvements were placed 
on the land in question and hence defendant is not in a position 
to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in aid of his 
claim." Id. at 698. In support of this statement, the Peterson 
court cited Tripp v. Baglev, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912 (1928). Like 
Peterson, Tripp also involved a rural property dispute in which 
one party claimed legal or equitable ownership of the disputed 
parcel situated along the boundary line between the respective 
properties. See generally Tripp, 276 P. 912. The Tripp court 
determined that equitable estoppel was not appropriate because 
(1) the party defending title had received rents and profits from 
and had paid all taxes on the disputed property, and (2) the 
party asserting estoppel could not have believed that the fence 
was on the true boundary line and "ha[d] made no improvements" on 
the disputed property. Id. at 918. 
1|8 We do not read these cases to require permanent improvements 
in order to resolve a residential boundary dispute by equitable 
estoppel. Neither of these cases expressly defined the elements 
of equitable estoppel. Further, later cases do not cite Peterson 
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and do not include permanent improvements in the required 
elements of equitable estoppel.5 Instead, they address whether 
the party asserting estoppel would suffer real injury if the true 
boundary line were now enforced. Cf. Dahl Inv. Co., 2004 UT App 
391, K 15 (affirming, with no reference to "permanent 
improvements," district courtfs determination that equitable 
estoppel applied to a portion of the boundary line upon which the 
asserting party had constructed a driveway, but not to the 
portion upon which the asserting party had done nothing, because 
forcing the asserting party "to abandon or remove the driveway 
would constitute an injury"). We therefore conclude that 
permanent improvements are not a separate element of equitable 
estoppel, but are required only insofar as they assist the court 
in evaluating the "reasonable action" and "injury" elements. 
f9 The Bahrs further argue that additional "nuanced 
requirements" must also be met to establish equitable estoppel, 
elements that the trial court erred in not considering. More 
specifically, the Bahrs argue that (1) application of equitable 
estoppel is disfavored generally, and contrary to public policy 
in the instant case; (2) wrongdoing or fraud is required of the 
Bahrs for equitable estoppel to be appropriate; and (3) a certain 
level of knowledge on the part of both parties is required.6 For 
reasons explained more fully below, we disagree with the Bahrs 
regarding the necessity of these "nuanced requirements." 
flO First, the Bahrs argue that application of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is generally disfavored, especially in the 
context of resolving boundary disputes, because it is contrary to 
the Utah Statute of Frauds and Utah recording statutes. The 
Bahrs cite no binding authority in support of this argument. The 
Bahrs argue that because Utah law expressly requires transfers of 
5For example, Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 
391, 101 P.3d 830, quotes CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 
Inc., 772 P.2d 967 (Utah 1989), in describing the elements of 
equitable estoppel. See Dahl Inv. Co., 2004 UT App 391, \ 14. 
CECO, in turn, cites several cases, none of which require 
"permanent improvements." See 772 P.2d at 969-70. 
6The Bahrs also argue that equitable estoppel is not 
available to the Imuses because the Imuses are primarily at fault 
for the deviation from the boundary line, given that the Imuses 
measured the boundary and installed the fence. The Imuses 
respond that this counter-estoppel argument was not raised before 
the trial court and, thus, is not appropriately before us on 
appeal. Regardless of whether this argument was preserved, we 
conclude that the undisputed facts do not establish fault by the 
Imuses. 
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land to be effected through a written instrument, estoppel should 
not be used to effect a transfer of title based only upon an 
alleged oral agreement. While we agree that an oral agreement is 
normally insufficient to effectuate passage of legal title to 
real property, see Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2007), the doctrine 
of estoppel in the boundary dispute context has been sanctioned 
in Utah to provide equitable title to property. In addition, 
there is no evidence before us that the trial court based its 
decision on an oral agreement between the parties; rather, the 
court determined only that it would not be equitable for the 
Bahrs now to challenge the boundary line to which they had not 
objected for many years. 
Kll Second, the Bahrs argue that the Imuses are allowed to 
assert estoppel only if the trial court finds that the Bahrs' 
behavior was fraudulent, misleading, or unconscionable. In 
support of this, the Bahrs cite Youngblood v. Auto-Owners 
Insurance Co., 2007 UT 28, 158 P.3d 1088, and IHC Health 
Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 2003 UT 5, 73 P.3d 320. 
Youngblood, an insurance case, involved the application of the 
equitable theory of promissory estoppel, defined by the court as 
where one party, in full knowledge of the material facts, makes a 
promise that turns out to be incorrect to the detriment of the 
other party who relied upon the promise. See 2007 UT 28, ^| 15-
16. The Youngblood court discussed the differences between 
equitable and promissory estoppel, and clarified that a 
misrepresentation as to the future is generally required for 
application of promissory estoppel. See id. The court described 
equitable estoppel as applying to "circumstances where it is not 
fair for a party to represent facts to be one way to get the 
other to agree, and then change positions later to the other's 
detriment." Id. K 15. We see nothing in Youngblood requiring 
fraudulent, misleading, or unconscionable behavior by the party 
sought to be estopped. See generally id. Therefore, Youngblood 
does not change our analysis. 
fl2 In IHC Health Services, Inc., the supreme court was faced 
with an estoppel argument based upon late acceptance of a rent 
payment. See 2003 UT 5, f 11. The party asserting estoppel in 
that case argued that IHC Health Services should be estopped from 
requiring on-time rent payments, because IHC had not objected to 
a late payment one month. See id. The supreme court noted that 
inaction for one month was insufficient to establish estoppel, 
because more than inaction or silence is required to conclude "it 
would be unconscionable to permit a person to maintain a position 
inconsistent with one in which he . . . has acquiesced." Id. 
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do 
not read IHC Health Services, Inc. as adding a requirement for 
equitable estoppel, but simply as describing whether the party 
acted reasonably based on the facts of that case. Because these 
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cases do not support the position taken by the Bahrs, we decline 
the invitation to add a requirement of wrongdoing by the party 
being estopped to the elements of equitable estoppel in the 
boundary dispute context. 
113 Third, the Bahrs argue that there is a knowledge requirement 
for equitable estoppel in the boundary dispute context. More 
specifically, the Bahrs contend that equitable estoppel was 
inappropriate in this case because they "had [no] actual 
knowledge that the Imuses were making any supposed improvements 
to the [D]isputed [Property]," and they "were not in a position 
to have actual knowledge of the true boundary line." Both of 
these arguments are unpersuasive. It is not credible that 
neighbors of twenty years would lack knowledge of improvements 
made along the separating boundary fence, especially when a tree 
growing along the boundary fence precipitated the present 
dispute. Further, it is the knowledge and actions of the Wymans, 
the Bahrs' predecessors in title, that generates the Imuses' 
claim of equitable estoppel.7 
Hl4 Finally, we examine whether the trial court erred in 
determining that the Imuses demonstrated that they had used the 
Disputed Property in reasonable reliance on the Bahrs' inaction 
and that they would be injured if the Bahrs were allowed to now 
enforce the true boundary line. See Dahl Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 
2004 UT App 391, 1 14, 101 P.3d 830 (listing the elements of 
equitable estoppel). After reviewing the parties' competing 
memoranda and hearing oral arguments, the trial court determined 
that the Imuses had satisfied the elements of estoppel so as to 
preclude the Bahrs from now objecting to the placement of the 
boundary fence. The trial court stated that it based this 
decision solely on the following undisputed material facts: 
1. [The Imuses] have lived in their current 
home . . . since March of 1983. 
2. In the summer of 1983, the Imuses met 
with their neighbors, the Wymans, . . . to 
discuss building a boundary fence along the 
property line dividing the two residential 
properties. 
3. Though the lots were located in a 
platted subdivision and the neighbors 
7The Bahrs' argument that they cannot be bound by the 
actions of their predecessors is unavailing. See Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel 
and Waiver § 133 (1964). 
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consulted a plat map, the [Imuses and Wymans] 
did not know the precise location of the 
boundary line between their properties, nor 
did they obtain a survey. 
4. The Imuses and Wymans then established a 
boundary line and the Imuses proceeded to 
construct a redwood fence on the agreed upon 
boundary line separating the two properties. 
5. The Imuses and Wymans thereafter treated 
this fence as a boundary between their 
properties and the Imuses installed 
improvements, landscaping and irrigation 
systems on their side of the fence. 
6. In 1984, the Wymans sold their property 
to Joe Carlisle, who also treated this fence 
as a boundary line between the properties 
until he sold the property to the [Bahrs], in 
December of 1988. 
7. No change in the treatment of the 
boundary line by the parties occurred until 
sometime in 2002 or 2003. 
8. During this . . . near 20 year period, 
the [Imuses], in addition to installing a 
sprinkling system, landscaped the property to 
their liking, which included admitted costs 
of improvements of $7000 to $9000. 
(Footnotes omitted.)8 
1fX5 Based on these undisputed material facts, the trial court 
concluded that the Wymans and Imuses had mutually established a 
boundary line between their respective properties. The trial 
court also determined that, in reasonable reliance on this 
established boundary line, the Imuses built a fence as a property 
8In making finding number seven, the trial court 
acknowledged that precisely when the boundary dispute began "is 
one of the key factual disputes in this case," but nevertheless 
determined that it was not material and, thus, did not preclude 
the entry of summary judgment. This, likewise, is the only 
factual dispute the Bahrs refer to on appeal. Because 
"acquiescence time" is not a requisite element of equitable 
estoppel, we agree with the trial court that this factual dispute 
is immaterial for summary judgment purposes. 
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line marker and installed improvements on the Disputed Property 
including "a shed, koi pond, and landscaping up to the fence 
line." The trial court continued, stating that neither of the 
Bahrs' predecessors had objected to the fence line and that, for 
a significant time, the Bahrs "did nothing to prevent the 
[Imuses] from maintaining and adding further improvements, such 
as vegetation and fixtures to the [Disputed Property]." 
Following this, the trial court summarized the facts from Dahl 
Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, 101 P.3d 830.9 The 
trial court then stated that, "[j]ust as in Dahl[], . . . the 
[Bahrs] may have been legally entitled to have the plat map 
boundary established as the legal boundary but . . . their 
actions (and the actions of their predecessors) estop them from 
[now] asserting their legal rights," because "the [Imuses] would 
be injured if [the Bahrs] were allowed to take possession of the 
[Disputed Property]." Concluding that all three elements of 
equitable estoppel had been met, the trial court entered summary 
9The Bahrs also argue that the trial court erred in relying 
on Dahl Investment Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, 101 P.3d 830, 
because it is factually distinguishable from the present appeal. 
In particular, the Bahrs argue that Dahl is inapposite to the 
present case because (1) Dahl involved an appeal after a full 
trial, whereas this appeal follows a grant of summary judgment; 
(2) unlike the party seeking estoppel in Dahl, "the Imuses are 
not hapless, unwitting victims"; (3) the Bahrs had no notice of 
the Imuses' alleged improvements; and (4) the landscaping and 
irrigation in the Imuses1 yard does not qualify as a permanent 
improvement, as did the driveway in Dahl. These distinctions are 
not persuasive, especially given the broadened discretion we 
grant to the trial court's estoppel determination. See 
Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 
676, 678 (Utah 1997). Moreover, the trial court did not rely 
exclusively on Dahl, but merely found Dahl to be "instructive in 
this case." The trial court summarized Dahl as follows: a fence 
between two properties established the legal boundary line; when 
the fence was torn down, the plaintiff didn't object to eighteen-
month construction of a driveway crossing that legal boundary; 
and even though the plaintiff may have been entitled to enforce 
the legal boundary, the plaintiff is estopped from doing so now 
that the driveway is built because removing the driveway would 
injure the defendants. The trial court then stated that, "[j]ust 
as in Dahl" the Bahrs may have been legally entitled to the 
Disputed Property, but their action and the action of their 
predecessors estops them from now asserting their legal rights. 
Because Dahl appears to be, as the trial court put it, 
"instructive in this case," we conclude that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in considering Dahl when making its 
decision. See id. 
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judgment in favor of the Imuses on that theory and denied all 
other relief requested. 
Kl6 Based on the undisputed material facts, the trial court 
correctly determined that the Imuses established each of the 
three required elements of equitable estoppel, see Dahl, 2004 UT 
App 391, f 14, and were entitled to ownership of the Disputed 
Property as a matter of law, see Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 
1 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
CONCLUSION 
Kl7 We agree with the trial court that precisely when the 
property dispute began is not material, that there are no 
disputed material facts, and that the Imuses are entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law based on an equitable 
estoppel theory. Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
H18 WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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